feat(phase-1): AC-7 数据读取按归属收口、AC-8 匿名写端点要凭据

清空全部历史(ImageHistoryController/Service)不再接受请求参数里的
user_id 当归属:改走 DataReadScope.readScope(...).userIdsOr(),scope 为空
集时 service 直接 log.warn + return 0,绝不退化成"不筛=全库"。每日档下载
(AdminShopDataCrawlTasksController/ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService)同样按
可见店铺 key 校验,越权回 BusinessException(403) 而非静默返回别人的文件。

AdminApiGuardFilter 新增 CREDENTIALED_WRITE_PATHS:/api/files/upload 与
/api/tasks/{id}/interrupted 这两个此前带 X-Internal-Token 即可匿名的写端点
改为解析不出身份即 401——静态共享密钥能证明走了内部通道,证明不了是谁。
该判定不吃 user-tool-guard-enabled 总闸,纯令牌存量客户端行为不变。

激活 Phase 0 预置的 3 支 pending 契约(AnonymousWriteGuard / HistoryClearScope /
DailyFileOwnership,去 @Disabled),另补 ImageHistoryServiceTest 迁移 + 2 例、
ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksDailyFileOwnershipTest 6 例行为判据。目标 127 例 0 失败。

他人的 collectdata in-flight 改动(CollectDataService/CollectDataHistoryItemVo/
BrandCollectDataTab/collect-data.ts 等)未卷入本提交。
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-28 17:03:24 +08:00
parent b3d90d2161
commit 0e2af88184
10 changed files with 307 additions and 27 deletions
@@ -51,6 +51,14 @@ import java.util.stream.Collectors;
* doFilterInternal 里仍解析不出身份、行为不变,存量客户端零影响。"要求凭据"这一步只能等客户端铺开后再开
* (user-tool-guard-enabled,配合 user-tool-guard-prefixes 按前缀分批收)。
*
* <p>两条写端点不再等总闸(2026-10-28 补,S0-7/AC-8):{@code POST /api/files/upload} 与
* {@code POST /api/tasks/{id}/interrupted} 收进 {@code CREDENTIALED_WRITE_PATHS}/
* {@code TASK_INTERRUPTED_SUFFIX},{@code user-tool-guard-enabled=false}(出厂默认)不再是它们的
* 豁免理由——匿名遍历 taskId 就能把别人的 RUNNING 任务置 FAILED,匿名上传能塞满临时盘。
* 可信内部令牌照常放行(4.0.66 客户端带令牌;旧客户端在这一跳会拿到 body.code=401,
* 崩溃残留上报退回服务端 stale 兜底,最长 30 分钟)。同前缀的 {@code pull-pending} 与
* {@code heartbeat} 不受影响:那条前缀下还有匿名直连的 worker 在用。
*
* <p>豁免项:OPTIONS 预检;以及 aiimage.security.admin-guard-exempt-prefixes 配置的前缀
* (逗号分隔,用于内部自动化/设备回调等确需匿名可达的端点)。紧急回退:
* aiimage.security.admin-guard-enabled=false 关闭本过滤器。
@@ -127,6 +135,13 @@ public class AdminApiGuardFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
"/api/user/cost-guard",
};
/** 必须解析得出身份才放行的确切写路径(S0-7/AC-8),不受 {@code user-tool-guard-enabled} 豁免。 */
private static final String[] CREDENTIALED_WRITE_PATHS = {"/api/files/upload"};
/** 打断任务这条动作:只收 {@code /api/tasks/{id}/interrupted},不动同前缀的 pull-pending/heartbeat。 */
private static final String TASK_PATH_PREFIX = "/api/tasks/";
private static final String TASK_INTERRUPTED_SUFFIX = "/interrupted";
private final AdminAuthSupport adminAuthSupport;
private final ObjectMapper objectMapper;
@@ -242,6 +257,14 @@ public class AdminApiGuardFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
writeFailure(response, code, ex.getMessage());
return;
}
if (identity == null && isCredentialRequiredWriteEndpoint(uri)) {
// 这两条写端点不接受"解析不出身份也照样往下走":requireUserOrInternal 对
// 某些空凭据形状是返回 null 而不是抛(S0-7 取证),只靠上面的 catch 会漏成放行。
log.warn("[admin-guard] {} {} 匿名写请求被拒:该端点不受 user-tool-guard-enabled 豁免",
request.getMethod(), uri);
writeFailure(response, 401, "未登录");
return;
}
} else {
// 归属绑定只约束"能解析出身份"的请求:存量匿名客户端(不带 JWT)解析不出身份,行为不变。
try {
@@ -308,6 +331,10 @@ public class AdminApiGuardFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
if (matchesPrefix(uri, ADMIN_API_PREFIX) || matchesPrefix(uri, DEBUG_PREFIX)) {
return true;
}
if (isCredentialRequiredWriteEndpoint(uri)) {
// S0-7/AC-8:匿名能打断别人的任务、匿名能塞满临时盘,这两条不挂总闸
return true;
}
for (String prefix : SELF_SERVICE_PREFIXES) {
if (matchesPrefix(uri, prefix)) {
return true;
@@ -316,6 +343,24 @@ public class AdminApiGuardFilter extends OncePerRequestFilter {
return userToolGuardEnabled && isUserToolPrefix(uri) && listedForGuard(uri);
}
/**
* 这两条写端点是否必须"解析得出身份"(或可信内部令牌)才放行——S0-7 收口。
*
* <p>刻意不收整条 {@code /api/tasks}:同前缀的 {@code pull-pending} 与 heartbeat 有
* 匿名直连的 worker 在用,蓝图 §3.1 只点名 interrupted 与 {@code /api/files/upload}。
* 收的是**确切路径 / 前后缀都对得上**的那一条动作,多一个字符都不算。
*/
static boolean isCredentialRequiredWriteEndpoint(String uri) {
String path = uri == null ? "" : uri;
for (String exact : CREDENTIALED_WRITE_PATHS) {
if (path.equals(exact)) {
return true;
}
}
return path.startsWith(TASK_PATH_PREFIX) && path.endsWith(TASK_INTERRUPTED_SUFFIX)
&& path.length() > TASK_PATH_PREFIX.length() + TASK_INTERRUPTED_SUFFIX.length();
}
/** 未强制要求凭据的用户态前缀:只要带了 user_id 参数,归属就得和令牌身份对齐。 */
private boolean needsOwnershipBinding(HttpServletRequest request, String uri) {
if (!isUserToolPrefix(uri)) {
@@ -55,13 +55,18 @@ public class ImageHistoryController {
}
@DeleteMapping("/history")
@Operation(summary = "清空全部生成记录")
public ApiResponse<Long> clearHistory(HttpServletRequest request) {
@Operation(summary = "清空所选范围内的生成记录")
public ApiResponse<Long> clearHistory(HttpServletRequest request,
@RequestParam(name = "company_id", required = false) Long companyId) {
AdminUserEntity operator = adminAuthSupport.requireConsoleOperatorOrInternal(request);
if (!permissionMenuService.hasAnyAdminMenu(operator, List.of("admin_history"))) {
throw new BusinessException(403, "无权访问生成记录模块");
}
long removed = imageHistoryService.clearAllHistory(operator.getUsername());
// S0-6(AC-7):清空必须走与上面列表**同一把**读范围。过去这一支只认菜单就把
// delete 全表交出去,任一管理员都能把别人公司的生成历史一次清光;
// 范围算不出来(空集)时 service 侧直接返回 0,绝不退化成"不筛"。
List<Long> scoped = dataReadScope.readScope(operator, companyId).userIdsOr(null);
long removed = imageHistoryService.clearAllHistory(operator.getUsername(), scoped);
return ApiResponse.success(removed);
}
}
@@ -92,12 +92,30 @@ public class ImageHistoryService {
return vo;
}
/** 清空全部生成记录(验收反馈:生成记录数据要可清理)。返回清理条数。 */
public long clearAllHistory(String operatorName) {
Long count = imageHistoryMapper.selectCount(new LambdaQueryWrapper<>());
/**
* 清空生成记录,删除范围由调用方经 {@code DataReadScope} 算好传入(S0-6/AC-7)。
*
* <p>{@code userIds} 的语义与 {@code listHistory} 逐字一致:{@code null} = 不筛
* (超管没选公司,保持既有行为),非 null = 只清这批账号。**空集直接返回 0**——
* 空集是"这个范围里一个成员账号都没有",退化成不筛就是去删别人的历史。
*
* <p>全清是不可逆操作,必须留下可查证的审计(谁、什么时候、清了哪个范围),
* 不能删完无声。返回清理条数。
*/
public long clearAllHistory(String operatorName, List<Long> userIds) {
String operator = operatorName == null ? "unknown" : operatorName;
if (userIds != null && userIds.isEmpty()) {
log.warn("[image-history] 管理员 {} 请求清空生成记录,但所选范围内没有任何成员账号 ⇒ 未删除任何行",
operator);
return 0L;
}
LambdaQueryWrapper<ImageHistoryEntity> scope = new LambdaQueryWrapper<>();
scope.in(userIds != null, ImageHistoryEntity::getUserId, userIds);
Long count = imageHistoryMapper.selectCount(scope);
long removed = count == null ? 0L : count;
imageHistoryMapper.delete(new LambdaQueryWrapper<>());
log.info("[image-history] 管理员 {} 清空生成记录,共清理 {} 条", operatorName == null ? "unknown" : operatorName, removed);
imageHistoryMapper.delete(scope);
log.info("[image-history] 管理员 {} 清空生成记录,共清理 {} 条,范围={}",
operator, removed, userIds == null ? "全部成员(超管未选公司)" : "指定成员 " + userIds.size() + " 人");
return removed;
}
@@ -108,13 +108,17 @@ public class AdminShopDataCrawlTasksController {
}
@GetMapping("/daily-files/{dailyFileId}/download")
@Operation(summary = "下载该店最新一次采集的数据文件(按累计档 id)")
@Operation(summary = "下载该店最新一次采集的数据文件(按累计档 id,限可见店铺)")
public void downloadDailyFile(
@PathVariable Long dailyFileId,
HttpServletRequest request,
HttpServletResponse response) {
requireShopDataCrawlTaskAccess(request);
ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService.DailyDownload daily = adminTasksService.resolveDailyDownload(dailyFileId);
// S0-6(AC-7):过去这两支都调了 requireShopDataCrawlTaskAccess 却把返回值丢掉,
// 于是只判到"有没有这张菜单",任何管理员按 id 就能下载/真删别人公司的档。
// 归属尺子与上面列表端点同一把(visibleShopKeys)。
AdminUserEntity operator = requireShopDataCrawlTaskAccess(request);
ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService.DailyDownload daily =
adminTasksService.resolveDailyDownload(dailyFileId, resolveOwnershipKeys(operator));
try {
response.setContentType("application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.spreadsheetml.sheet");
DownloadHeaderUtil.setAttachment(response, daily.filename());
@@ -128,15 +132,29 @@ public class AdminShopDataCrawlTasksController {
}
@DeleteMapping("/daily-files/{dailyFileId}")
@Operation(summary = "删除该店这条店铺数据记录(累计档 + 文件 + 明细,管理端显式操作)")
@Operation(summary = "删除该店这条店铺数据记录(累计档 + 文件 + 明细,限可见店铺)")
public ApiResponse<Void> deleteDailyFile(
@PathVariable Long dailyFileId,
HttpServletRequest request) {
requireShopDataCrawlTaskAccess(request);
adminTasksService.deleteAdminDailyFile(dailyFileId);
AdminUserEntity operator = requireShopDataCrawlTaskAccess(request);
adminTasksService.deleteAdminDailyFile(dailyFileId, resolveOwnershipKeys(operator));
return ApiResponse.success(null);
}
/**
* 按 id 操作单档时的归属范围:口径与列表端点逐字一致,只是没有公司 tab(传 null)。
*
* <p>超管没选公司 ⇒ {@code readScope} 不筛 ⇒ 返回 {@code null}(全量);
* 非超管 ⇒ 按他管的店铺分组推可见集,与他在这一页列表里看到的范围相同。
*/
private List<String> resolveOwnershipKeys(AdminUserEntity operator) {
boolean superAdmin = DeviceSessionPolicy.isSuper(adminAuthSupport.currentRole(operator));
List<Long> companyMemberIds = superAdmin
? dataReadScope.readScope(operator, null).userIdsOr(null)
: null;
return adminTasksService.resolveVisibleShopKeys(operator.getId(), superAdmin, companyMemberIds);
}
@PostMapping("/download-zip")
@Operation(summary = "批量下载选中结果文件为 zip(文件部分失败经响应头 X-Archive-Error-Count 提示)")
public void downloadZip(
@@ -59,8 +59,20 @@ public class ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService {
public record DailyDownload(String url, String filename) {
}
/** 按累计档 id 解析可下载地址(生成新鲜签名 URL)与文件名。 */
public DailyDownload resolveDailyDownload(Long dailyFileId) {
/**
* 按累计档 id 解析可下载地址(生成新鲜签名 URL)与文件名。
*
* <p>S0-6/AC-7:取档必须先过店铺归属。{@code visibleShopKeys} 与列表端点同一把尺子
* ({@code null} = 全量,非 null = 只认这批店铺名 key),归属判定写在这条路径内部,
* 不靠调用方自觉——过去两个按 id 的入口都只吃一个 id,任一有菜单的管理员
* 都能按 id 下载/真删别人公司的每日档。
*/
public DailyDownload resolveDailyDownload(Long dailyFileId, List<String> visibleShopKeys) {
ShopDataCrawlDailyFileEntity owned = dailyFileService.findById(dailyFileId);
if (owned == null) {
throw new BusinessException("记录不存在");
}
requireShopVisible(owned.getShopName(), visibleShopKeys);
ShopDataCrawlDownloadRowDto row = adminTasksMapper.selectDownloadRowById(dailyFileId);
if (row == null || row.getResultFileUrl() == null || row.getResultFileUrl().isBlank()) {
throw new BusinessException("记录不存在或文件未就绪");
@@ -73,8 +85,23 @@ public class ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService {
return new DailyDownload(url, filename);
}
/** 管理端真删该店这条店铺数据记录(累计档 + 文件 + 明细),仅允许删除已生成文件的终态记录。 */
public void deleteAdminDailyFile(Long dailyFileId) {
/** 该档归属的店铺是否在这个操作人可见范围内({@code visibleShopKeys == null} = 全量,直接通过)。 */
private void requireShopVisible(String shopName, List<String> visibleShopKeys) {
if (visibleShopKeys == null) {
return;
}
if (!visibleShopKeys.contains(normalizeShopKey(shopName))) {
// 拒到 403 而不是"返回一个空下载地址":空壳会让用户以为自己的档案丢了
throw new BusinessException(403, "无权访问其他公司的店铺数据");
}
}
/**
* 管理端真删该店这条店铺数据记录(累计档 + 文件 + 明细),仅允许删除已生成文件的终态记录。
*
* <p>S0-6/AC-7:真删比下载更危险,同一把归属尺子必须在动手之前落。
*/
public void deleteAdminDailyFile(Long dailyFileId, List<String> visibleShopKeys) {
if (dailyFileId == null || dailyFileId <= 0) {
throw new BusinessException("参数不合法");
}
@@ -82,6 +109,7 @@ public class ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService {
if (dailyFile == null) {
throw new BusinessException("记录不存在");
}
requireShopVisible(dailyFile.getShopName(), visibleShopKeys);
TaskDistributedLockService.LockHandle lockHandle = dailyFileService.acquireLock(dailyFile.getShopKey());
if (lockHandle == null) {
throw new BusinessException("店铺数据正在处理中,请稍后重试");
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.nanri.aiimage.common.exception.BusinessException;
import com.nanri.aiimage.common.model.entity.AdminUserEntity;
import com.nanri.aiimage.common.security.AdminAuthSupport;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Disabled;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.springframework.mock.web.MockFilterChain;
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
* 401 的形状沿用既有口径:HTTP 200 + body.code=401(见 {@code AdminApiGuardFilterTest:286-301}
* 与 {@code writeFailure:293-298}),不许拿 status 冒充。
*/
@Disabled("Pending Phase 1: AC-8 匿名写接口收紧(interrupted / files/upload)")
@DisplayName("AC-8 匿名写接口必须要求内部令牌或合法 JWT")
class PendingPhase1AnonymousWriteGuardTest {
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package com.nanri.aiimage.modules.imagehistory.controller;
import com.nanri.aiimage.testutil.SourceScan;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Disabled;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
@@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
* 范围入参,而它一旦改成带范围,本用例的调用形状也得跟着换——那属于 Phase 1 的接口契约变更,
* 应该在实现时以真实签名落地(蓝图 §4 Phase 1 已登记本文件的激活与改造同步点)。
*/
@Disabled("Pending Phase 1: AC-7 生成历史清空按数据范围收口")
@DisplayName("AC-7 清空生成历史必须过 DataReadScope")
class PendingPhase1HistoryClearScopeTest {
@@ -24,7 +24,12 @@ import static org.mockito.Mockito.never;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
/** 验收反馈:生成记录数据要可清理——DELETE 清空全表并返回清理条数。 */
/**
* 验收反馈:生成记录数据要可清理——DELETE 清掉范围内记录并返回清理条数。
*
* <p>2026-10-28(AC-7/S0-6)起删除带数据范围:{@code userIds} 为 null 是不筛(超管没选公司,
* 保持既有全量语义),空集是"这个范围里没有成员账号"⇒ 一行都不许删,绝不退化成不筛。
*/
class ImageHistoryServiceTest {
@BeforeEach
@@ -45,7 +50,7 @@ class ImageHistoryServiceTest {
when(historyMapper.selectCount(any())).thenReturn(42L);
long removed = service.clearAllHistory("admin");
long removed = service.clearAllHistory("admin", null);
assertThat(removed).isEqualTo(42L);
verify(historyMapper).delete(any());
@@ -59,10 +64,38 @@ class ImageHistoryServiceTest {
when(historyMapper.selectCount(any())).thenReturn(0L);
assertThat(service.clearAllHistory("admin")).isZero();
assertThat(service.clearAllHistory("admin", null)).isZero();
verify(historyMapper).delete(any());
}
@Test
void 空成员集必须一行都不删() {
// S0-6 的关键边界:空集="这家公司没有成员账号",退化成不筛就是去删别人公司的历史。
// 所以既不许 selectCount 也不许 delete——一次 DB 调用都不能有。
ImageHistoryMapper historyMapper = mock(ImageHistoryMapper.class);
AdminUserMapper userMapper = mock(AdminUserMapper.class);
ImageHistoryService service = new ImageHistoryService(historyMapper, userMapper, new ObjectMapper());
assertThat(service.clearAllHistory("admin", List.of())).isZero();
verify(historyMapper, never()).delete(any());
verify(historyMapper, never()).selectCount(any());
}
@Test
void 带范围时必须把成员集合写进删除条件() {
// 范围不能只在方法签名上存在:delete 的 wrapper 必须带上 user_id IN (...)。
ImageHistoryMapper historyMapper = mock(ImageHistoryMapper.class);
AdminUserMapper userMapper = mock(AdminUserMapper.class);
ImageHistoryService service = new ImageHistoryService(historyMapper, userMapper, new ObjectMapper());
when(historyMapper.selectCount(any())).thenReturn(3L);
assertThat(service.clearAllHistory("admin", List.of(7L, 8L))).isEqualTo(3L);
ArgumentCaptor<LambdaQueryWrapper<ImageHistoryEntity>> captor = ArgumentCaptor.captor();
verify(historyMapper).delete(captor.capture());
assertThat(captor.getValue().getSqlSegment()).contains("user_id");
}
// ---------- 公司 tab 的成员集合怎么进这条查询(Task 8 后半页) ----------
//
// 范围在 controller 里由 DataReadScope 算,service 只收算好的 List<Long> userIds:
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.controller;
import com.nanri.aiimage.testutil.SourceScan;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Disabled;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
@@ -18,7 +17,6 @@ import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
* 而列表接口本来就算过 {@code visibleShopKeys}({@code ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService.java:231}),
* 边界口径在同模块内部劈叉——与生成历史清空是同一个病形。
*/
@Disabled("Pending Phase 1: AC-7 每日档下载/删除按店铺归属校验")
@DisplayName("AC-7 每日档下载/删除必须校验归属")
class PendingPhase1DailyFileOwnershipTest {
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
package com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.service;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThat;
import static org.assertj.core.api.Assertions.assertThatThrownBy;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.anyString;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.never;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.verify;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.ObjectMapper;
import com.nanri.aiimage.common.exception.BusinessException;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.file.service.oss.OssStorageService;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.mapper.ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksMapper;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.mapper.ShopDataCrawlItemMapper;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.model.dto.ShopDataCrawlDownloadRowDto;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.model.entity.ShopDataCrawlDailyFileEntity;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.spi.DuplicateCheckRefreshPort;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.shopdatacrawl.spi.ManagedShopNamesPort;
import com.nanri.aiimage.modules.task.mapper.FileResultMapper;
import java.util.List;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.DisplayName;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
/**
* 每日档按 id 取档/删档的归属闸门(S0-6/AC-7 的真实行为判据)。
*
* <p>{@code PendingPhase1DailyFileOwnershipTest} 钉的是源码连线(校验有没有写在取 URL 之前),
* 本类钉的是行为:越界必须 403 且**一次副作用都不许发生**(不许生成签名 URL、不许进分布式锁)。
* 范围口径与列表端点共用 {@code visibleShopKeys}:{@code null} = 全量(超管没选公司),
* 空集 = 一家都不可见,非空 = 只认这批店铺名 key(同一套 trim + 小写归一)。
*/
class ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksDailyFileOwnershipTest {
private ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksMapper adminTasksMapper;
private ShopDataCrawlDailyFileService dailyFileService;
private OssStorageService ossStorageService;
private ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService service;
@BeforeEach
void setUp() {
adminTasksMapper = mock(ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksMapper.class);
dailyFileService = mock(ShopDataCrawlDailyFileService.class);
ossStorageService = mock(OssStorageService.class);
service = new ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService(
adminTasksMapper, mock(ManagedShopNamesPort.class),
mock(ShopDataCrawlItemMapper.class),
mock(FileResultMapper.class),
dailyFileService,
ossStorageService,
mock(ShopDataCrawlTaskService.class),
mock(DuplicateCheckRefreshPort.class),
new ObjectMapper());
}
private void givenDailyFileOf(String shopName) {
ShopDataCrawlDailyFileEntity dailyFile = new ShopDataCrawlDailyFileEntity();
dailyFile.setId(9001L);
dailyFile.setShopName(shopName);
dailyFile.setShopKey("key-9001");
when(dailyFileService.findById(9001L)).thenReturn(dailyFile);
}
private void givenDownloadRow() {
ShopDataCrawlDownloadRowDto row = new ShopDataCrawlDownloadRowDto();
row.setResultFileUrl("nanri-image/versions/9001.xlsx");
row.setResultFilename("9001.xlsx");
when(adminTasksMapper.selectDownloadRowById(9001L)).thenReturn(row);
when(ossStorageService.generateFreshDownloadUrl(anyString())).thenReturn("https://oss/signed");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("全量范围(超管没选公司):照常取到签名地址")
void unfilteredScopeStillResolves() {
givenDailyFileOf(" company-a-shop ");
givenDownloadRow();
ShopDataCrawlAdminTasksService.DailyDownload daily = service.resolveDailyDownload(9001L, null);
assertThat(daily.url()).isEqualTo("https://oss/signed");
assertThat(daily.filename()).isEqualTo("9001.xlsx");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("可见集里的店铺:归一后命中就放行")
void visibleShopIsAllowed() {
givenDailyFileOf("Company-A-Shop");
givenDownloadRow();
assertThat(service.resolveDailyDownload(9001L, List.of("company-a-shop")).url())
.isEqualTo("https://oss/signed");
}
@Test
@DisplayName("别人公司的档:403 且不生成签名地址")
void foreignShopDownloadIsRefused() {
givenDailyFileOf("company-b-shop");
givenDownloadRow();
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.resolveDailyDownload(9001L, List.of("company-a-shop")))
.isInstanceOfSatisfying(BusinessException.class,
ex -> assertThat(ex.getCode()).isEqualTo(403));
verify(ossStorageService, never()).generateFreshDownloadUrl(anyString());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("可见集为空=一家都不可见,不许退化成全量")
void emptyScopeRefusesInsteadOfShowingEverything() {
givenDailyFileOf("company-a-shop");
givenDownloadRow();
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.resolveDailyDownload(9001L, List.of()))
.isInstanceOf(BusinessException.class);
}
@Test
@DisplayName("删别人公司的档:403 且不进分布式锁(副作用一次都不许发生)")
void foreignShopDeleteStopsBeforeLock() {
givenDailyFileOf("company-b-shop");
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.deleteAdminDailyFile(9001L, List.of("company-a-shop")))
.isInstanceOfSatisfying(BusinessException.class,
ex -> assertThat(ex.getCode()).isEqualTo(403));
verify(dailyFileService, never()).acquireLock(any());
verify(dailyFileService, never()).deleteDailyFile(any());
}
@Test
@DisplayName("档不存在:报记录不存在,而不是当成越权放行")
void missingDailyFileIsNotFound() {
when(dailyFileService.findById(9001L)).thenReturn(null);
assertThatThrownBy(() -> service.resolveDailyDownload(9001L, List.of("company-a-shop")))
.isInstanceOfSatisfying(BusinessException.class,
ex -> assertThat(ex).hasMessageContaining("记录不存在"));
}
}